mean that as a biological, physiological and psychological matter every individual has a disposition to cope with a certain amount of diversity -tolerance of a non-moralizing kind-that does not depend on sophisticated moral reasons. 8 The practice of tolerance does not depend on a prior decision to refrain from opposing some categories of beliefs or people.
I shall argue that non-moralizing tolerance should be distinguished from moralizing toleration and should be understood as the human disposition to cope with diversity in a changing environment. Tolerance thus defined is the basis for an alternative approach to deal with religious conflicts. Such an approach is less dependent on normative assumptions and more responsive to empirical data, including psychological insights as to the human ability to deal with difference. In what follows, I will first present toleration as a moralizing attitude. Then I will show the limits of liberal theories based on such an understanding of toleration. I will suggest instead that we should pay more attention to tolerance understood as the natural disposition of every individual to cope with difference as the best basis for dealing with religious conflicts.
Toleration as a moralizing attitude
I will start with one definition of religious toleration given by the OED: "Allowance (with or without limitations), by the ruling power, of the exercise of religion otherwise than in the form officially established or recognized." 9 One of the striking elements of this definition is the suggestion that there is an established religion to start with. According to this definition, toleration implies an act of establishment of a religion. Albeit striking, this is not inconsistent with the present existence of an established church of England and with many others de jure established churches in Europe, not to speak of de facto established churches. The second, closely connected, element of the definition is that there is an asymmetry between the majority and the minorities. The religion of the majority is free by definition, while minority religions are permitted by political fiat. Here lies the third element of the definition: The allowance is given out by the ruling power; it is a top down concession that can be revoked whenever the ruling power decides so. And the ruling power can decide as well (fourth element) whether or not to impose limits to the allowance graciously granted.
There may be disagreement about the scope of toleration, but there is agreement as to its point. Toleration carves out a space between right and wrong beliefs. It is the space of tolerable wrong beliefs. In the Act of Toleration 1689 Anglican beliefs are held to be the right ones.
Protestant beliefs are tolerable wrong beliefs; Catholic beliefs are plainly wrong and therefore unacceptable. In many European states, including the UK, this implied that one religious faith is recognized as official truth and the other faiths as wrong. Toleration thus defined is an act of establishment of right beliefs, and as such it is deeply problematic. The wrongness of religious (or secular) beliefs is only postulated but not argued for. Any imposition flowing from such a postulate is likely to be regarded as irrational and unfair.
Toleration is a political ideal allegedly imposed by natural reason that requires people to put up with a certain amount of wrong beliefs. 10 Not all wrong beliefs are tolerated though, some are considered intolerably wrong. In this context, it is certainly better to be tolerated than not, but it does not mean that being tolerated should be regarded as a privilege. 11 The key of toleration is that the state singles out morally right beliefs which become official truth. Other beliefs, despite being officially wrong, can be tolerated either out of principled respect or out of prudential calculation.
Liberals of different stripes disagree about toleration. More generally, they disagree as to how to create and maintain a cohesive society given the fact of pluralism. Two main strategies appear to characterize liberal attitudes towards religion: one is instrumental and the other is principled. The instrumental approach starts from the inevitability of conflicts amongst religious people or between religious and secular people. It is rooted in XVII century Europe and its experience with religious conflicts. The instrumental approach can take two forms. The first calls for peaceful coexistence for the sake of a more secure and conflict free society and despite major disagreement on issues of belief for. If someone does not comply, then the sovereign authority is entitled to punish someone for intolerance. We can call it coexistence conception of toleration (Hobbes). The second relies on the fact that the state cannot coerce people to revise their beliefs and that is why one has to accept them, however grudgingly. We can call it permission conception of toleration. I have already mentioned that both the Act of Toleration 1689 and But of course, the court must also respect the existence of social and cultural traditions. The issue of respect from a moralizing perspective is problematic because it is highly individualistic and insists only on the respect of individual convictions. But the whole society has an interest in having their cultural and social traditions respected as well. The reasoning of the court does not take this into account but simply leans towards an individualistic morality of rights: principled approaches regard rights as individual entitlements to use against the state. The problem is that there is something missing from the picture, which cannot be accounted in terms of rights: it is the power of any nation state to define its symbols of cultural and political allegiance.
From the viewpoint of instrumental toleration the issue is slightly different and focuses on the role of the symbol itself. Is the display of such a symbol conducive to an environment where all the pupils can coexist without feeling emotionally disturbed by an exclusive environment?
Instrumental approaches regard rights as side constraints on the power of the state, but also on the rights of other people. From this viewpoint, they are more inclined to accept that there may be conflicts between two rights in given circumstances. Interests protected by rights can reasonably clash one against another. It is easier to see that the state can have interests at odds with those of the individual claimant. However, instrumental approaches do not offer a viable alternative to the vacuum they create. They may be powerful arguments against displaying one given symbol, but does that mean that no symbol can promote co-existence? Instrumental approaches of the multiculturalist stripe end up promoting the existence of various institutions which promote their own values separately. This is the system of multi-faith schools that pays lip service to diversity but does not do much to promote convergence.
Both toleration and respect involve the evaluation of the costs of having a plural society.
The justification of such solutions differs. For principled approaches, equal citizenship means that each individual should divest herself of any social or cultural attachment other than the republican one when living in a public space. It is not pleasant, but this is the cost to pay for having a plural society in which everyone has equal voice. Instrumental approaches stress the difference between people rather than one identity. Minority groups have different needs compared to the majority. They therefore have to be accommodated so that their rights protect their needs even if this waters down important values in some instances.
Neither approach, however, is capable to fully cope with the conflict between secular and religious people. Either solution entails more polarization rather than less. The republican position leaves no room for diversity, while the multicultural position leaves no room for convergence. Both approaches over-rely on rights as encapsulating liberal values that can potentially be accommodated either through ranking or through definitional balancing. Neither approach captures the day-to-day practice of living together (as opposed to the moralizing attitudes of co-existence or respect) which is a much more reliable basis for an approach that attempts to cope with the existence of religious conflicts.
A Fresh Start: Tolerance distinguished from toleration
English is the only European language to draw a distinction between Tolerance and Toleration. In German (Toleranz), French (Tolerance), Italian (Tolleranza) and Spanish (Tolerancia) there is only one name for those concepts. Not that the distinction in English is clear and easily applicable. Tolerance and Toleration are used as synonyms in the literature; often one finds the two used interchangeably. But I do believe that it is possible to draw a distinction between toleration-as-a-moralizing attitude and tolerance-as-a-natural-disposition. The former is a normative concept, while the latter is descriptive. A similar distinction is drawn by historian Here, I propose a stipulative definition of tolerance distinguished from toleration. I am not suggesting that the distinction mirrors ordinary language closely, although it has a link to it.
However, I argue that this distinction illuminates both theory and practice. It puts the latter in a Tolerance is the disposition of putting up with external agents of disturbance; it involves a psychological attitude that strikes a middle ground between wholehearted acceptance and unrestrained opposition. 25 In a fairly stable society, most people lean towards that attitude;
tolerance as a disposition carves out a space for every individual to flourish according to one's own beliefs alone and relatively unencumbered by the multifarious emotional inputs that derives from other people's beliefs and behaviours. If one did respond to each external stimulus, then the ability to flourish independently would be seriously hampered. Life would boil down to an emotional roller-coaster whereby our beliefs and behaviour are always defined in opposition to, or in emulation of, other people beliefs and behaviours. Needless to say, this already is the case in many circumstances but it cannot possibly be the norm of our life otherwise we would be unable to develop and flourish autonomously. Tolerance thus defined is not about drawing a priori moral lines and impose them on issues of conflicting beliefs, but it is about the ability to cope with them in a way that does not divert individuals from flourishing. Of course, tolerance is a matter of degree. It can only work when someone or a society is in a condition of mental and physical stability, rather than being embroiled in unproductive conflicts. The healthier the individual or the society, the greater its ability to cope with external agents of disturbance and vice-versa.
Tolerance as a non-moralizing approach
My approach starts from tolerance-as-a-disposition rather than moralizing toleration. It is different and can be distinguished from both principled and instrumental approaches that promote toleration as a moralizing attitude. There are three main differences between a moralizing and a non-moralizing approach.
Firstly, tolerance is not a principle to be imposed by legislation or a virtue to be preached by elites, but a human disposition that needs to be understood. Tolerance thus conceived depends on bodily rather than mental processes. Tolerance is not a behaviour that is imposed either by a moral or political doctrine, but it is a behaviour that emerges as a natural human response to difference. It is not the moral or political means through which religious conflicts are solved and dispelled, but the innate response to the fact that each one of us experiences conflicting emotions when faced with diversity. When a society is stable and healthy, there is little talk of the practice of tolerance. It is when things go wrong that intolerance is on everyone's mouth.
Secondly, tolerance as a disposition can only flourish in an environment where freedom of thought is protected above everything else. No thought is to be considered as right or wrong from the outset, as it is the case from a moralizing viewpoint. Every person, be them secular or religious, should be free to advance their own ideas and beliefs and argue for them.
Disagreement between people can only help to sharpen thought and allow truth to emerge. This is only possible, though, if no assumption or presupposition is considered to be dogma. A healthy polity will devise ways to cope with disagreement, but will never find a way to solve an issue once and for ever.
Thirdly, a non-moralizing approach insists that negative emotions towards diversity are the result of lack of appropriate thinking. Now that the three main differences have been set out, it is possible to elaborate a more articulated approach to cope with conflicts between religious and secular people. The starting point is the acknowledgement of clashes within each one of us: We all oscillate between wholehearted acceptance and unrestrained opposition when we are first exposed to people whose behaviour and symbols markedly differ from ours. If each individual simply followed those emotions unreflectively, we would constantly go through a rollercoaster that leaves no time for flourishing. Tolerance as a disposition is a naturally devised disposition that helps us to mediate between strong emotional reactions. As a matter of practice, each one of us is prepared to put up with a great deal of behaviour that may appear to be inconsistent with societal values or individually held beliefs. This is explainable in terms of the drive to survival that characterizes our self-development. 27 We would not be able to concentrate on our own flourishing if we were constantly pulled in one or another direction. Human beings have worked out a great number of collective responses to clashes within.
Religion, for example, is a given response to a peculiar clash within. We feel that we are eternal, when we reflect about our soul, and yet we know that we are mortal. This explains why religion is still so fundamental in the life of the great majority of people all over the world. It is because it does give an answer and allows people to get on with their lives in the meanwhile. Individuals and groups care a great deal about the precise answer they have been given. They care because they believe it is true. And as a consequence, they must believe that any other answer is false. How is it possible to tolerate a false claim on something that is so important to people's lives?
The spiritual clash within --mediated through institutional religion--is sometimes projected onto the external world. It becomes a social conflict between individuals, groups, and even nations. Europe as a whole was devastated by such a conflict in the XVII century. The political response to it was to carve out religiously homogeneous regions within which people would not be requested to tolerate other religious views. Toleration as a political virtue applied to relationships between nation states following the Treaty of Westphalia 1648. Homogeneity, however, is itself unstable because the natural freedom of thought with which we are endowed pushes us in different directions (as it was the case for Luther, Zwingly and Calvin for example).
Moreover, homogeneity has never been truly met amongst the people. Historical accounts of life in Europe show that different religious communities had to live side by side and the important news is that they generally found ways to do so.
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Tolerance as defined here supports a non-moralizing attitude towards diversity rather than one that divides the world in right and wrong beliefs a priori. But unfortunately there are instances in which tolerance leaves its place to unrestrained opposition and this entails a spiral of social polarization and ultimately violence. In these cases, I don't believe that it is helpful at all to preach the attitude of toleration as a political ideal that would solve those conflicts. The most important thing to begin with is to reflect about the causes that led to intolerance. Political and economic considerations are obviously important. These undermine self-confidence and hope.
When fears enter the scene, it is almost impossible to avoid the consequence that our clash within between acceptance and opposition will be resolved in favour of the former.
Knowledge of Fear
Tolerance as a disposition informs the relationship between individuals belonging to different groups in a society. The instinctive mechanism of tolerance, however, can be hampered by the existence of entrenched prejudices and fears flowing from misunderstandings about other people. A racist, for example, is not able to tolerate as his conception of the other will be clouded by a set of prejudices formed a-priori. Mutual knowledge that dispels prejudices is therefore absolutely necessary to promote and encourage a flourishing practice of tolerance.
Unfortunately, it is often the case that prejudices are associated with fears; these two together make the possibility of mutual knowledge very difficult.
Knowledge of fear allows every individual to form reflective ideas about emotions; the process of subconscious enquiry is a good tool to keep emotional reactions under control. The smooth working, and development, of tolerance-as-a-disposition depends among other things on the knowledge of one's own fears. But of course this investigation is a matter of individual choice and cannot be imposed on anyone. Individuals who oscillate between competing emotions without being able to find a middle ground are in a difficult position and can hardly flourish under these conditions. If each one of us was able to inspect our subconscious and dig out the root causes of fear, then we would oscillate much less perilously between opposing emotions towards diversity. Of course, on a grand societal scale it is impossible to promote this; so each one of us has to put up with a certain amount of entrenched emotions that cannot be explained away rationally. Institutions can nevertheless nurture and protect the natural disposition to tolerate in many other ways and in particular through education.
Fear is not only negative. It performs a very valuable role in the life of human beings. It averts the mind to an impendent danger and calls for a cautious attitude towards an unknown object or person. Fear warrants against immediate reaction or engagement. It generally nudges the individual towards further examination as to the actual danger faced. It also promotes a cognitive attitude geared towards the knowledge of the external world. When you know the object or person that is feared, you are able to apprehend it in a way that is not dangerous anymore. Perhaps our fear will disappear altogether as knowledge will have shown that there is no danger intrinsic to the external object or person triggering fear. So not only fear protects us from danger, but it may also stimulate our knowledge of the external world which is yet unexplained.
Sometimes, however, fear overwhelms us and temporarily clouds our reason. We are frozen into inaction and we refuse to know the object of our fears. This is the case for example with Muslim minorities in Europe. Many consider them as a threat to Europe and depict them as such in the media. The mass reaction to those minorities is dictated by such fears and entails unrestrained opposition to some or all aspects of the behaviour of the minority. Most of the time, this reaction is not supported by actual knowledge but is simply based on a stereotypical description of the target of hatred. Fear can become phobia when left uncontrolled by reflective attitudes. Phobia is a systematic fear against persons or objects that has become entrenched and cannot be removed by the usual cognitive process that leads our minds to apprehend the external world. It is quite plain to say that today in Europe there is a widespread Islamophobia. That is, a systematic fear towards religious minorities that pits them against the secular western society.
The general reaction toward those minorities is unrestrained opposition and there does not seem to be an easy way out of this deadlock. Phillips. 33 Both genuinely hoped that by engaging with sharia law, part of the mistery and fear that surrounds it would be dispelled. And when fear lifts its hold and let the place to further knowledge, then we can finally learn that sharia law is not that different from legal codes of behaviour that are closer to the western world. Some elements of sharia law will remain incompatible with ordinary law; in particular physical punishments will be at odds with our practices. But those punishments are not the core of sharia law, they are perfectly detachable elements of a general system of rules that can be regarded as compatible with ordinary laws. This is not to say that we are under an obligation to wholeheartedly accept sharia law.
After examination, we may still conclude that we disagree with its fundamental tenets, and we consider it as not fully acceptable. But this is not a ground for unrestrained opposition either. people who follow sharia law to guide their behaviour in certain domains. It is also possible that a conflict between two religious people be solved by an arbitrator they both accept. But it is not permissible to have rules of behaviour that are incompatible with ordinary laws.
Law and Tolerance (Lautsi again)
The best way to illustrate the practical difference of my approach is to use the Lautsi case again. There are three main aspects to take into account from my perspective: Firstly, the conflict should be regarded as an opportunity for knowledge. Is the crucifix in Italy a symbol of secularism as the state claims? The Italian government, for example, "attributed to the crucifix a neutral and secular meaning with reference to Italian history and tradition, which were closely bound up with Christianity." 34 One may object that the crucifix is neutral, but it is hard to dismiss the role played by Christianity in Italy in shaping the social and political space in many ways. It is of course possible to suggest that secularism developed in opposition to religious values, but it would be churlish to claim that secular and religious values are mutually exclusive since their history is one of exchange and dialogue rather than competition and denial. The role of reason in promoting knowledge is however limited and it cannot be held that deeper knowledge of conflicting interests leads to a better solution in practice. This leads us to the second element of my approach.
The limits of knowledge through reason give rise to the necessity of imagination as a way to find a new solution for the future. Can we really deal with this issue by applying old standards? Is it possible to solve the conundrum posed by Lautsi simply by applying a conception of secularism that does not take into account social and cultural traditions of one country? The presence of a symbol can be the starting point of a creative debate. Pupils may be asked whether they want to complement that symbol or whether they want to remove it. In either case, they should be asked to provide an explanation. Those who take the crucifix for granted would have to review their position, while those who oppose it or never even thought about it are encouraged to think about it from a completely free viewpoint. The crucifix could be considered as a starting point for reflection rather than an endpoint. This may truly put the students in a position where they can empathize with other students. This leads to my third point.
Knowledge and imagination must be supported by an ability to put oneself in other people's shoes. This was arguably very difficult some years ago in Italy when the vast majority of the population was Catholic. In such a context, it was difficult to appreciate the viewpoint of a diverse position. Immigration and further secularization today have created a more diverse environment in the classroom and in the society. It is therefore more important than ever to engage in an empathic process that leads people to know their mutual starting points so that negative emotions and passions can be ruled out from the outset.
To sum up, law can promote tolerance and a healthy environment by providing three essential services: it has to stimulate mutual knowledge by providing genuine platforms of cultural exchange, starting with primary education where one can learn about religious differences. Secondly, it has to stimulate freedom of thought through creative and imaginative channels rather than imposing a ready made set of values. Thirdly, it should encourage each and every individual to put themselves in someone else's shoes so that negative emotions towards diversity can be effectively reined in. Solon claimed that each society deserves the laws that it can bear. 35 Let me explain why this makes sense: a society that is ridden by conflict and hysteria will only be able to bear laws that do not upset the majority. As a consequence the minority will be silenced and suppressed. Vice versa, a society that is strong and stable will bear much more easily internal conflicts without breaking into pieces. Those conflicts will be regarded as opportunities to engage in further knowledge. They will also push us all to re-interpret creatively our traditions so as to fit as many diverging views as possible.
Conclusions
Religious conflicts will not be solved or explained away once and for all. They will keep
coming back and present difficult decisions for all the European states, as well as for European institutions. The master narrative of toleration is not capable of dispelling all the issues that arise between secular majorities and religious minorities. It may well be that toleration was the right answer to religious conflicts in the XVI century. In a world that was little secularized, the major issue was to create a space for both religious minorities and majorities. Toleration presented a reason against aggression of religious minorities that held wrong beliefs from the viewpoint of the majority.
But the price to pay for toleration was high: the entrenchment of official truth about right beliefs, and the subsequent creation of a trichotomy between right, wrong and tolerable beliefs that is not easy to police by the state without major inconsistencies. Such a trichotomy could only come with a moralizing attitude between majorities and minorities and with an isolation of minorities and a huge limitation on the dissent about majority values. Social homogeneity achieved stability at the prize of freedom of thought on the fundamental issues of the society. 35 Montesquieu, L'Esprit des Lois, Paris: Flammarion.
Europe remained homogeneous for a long time and enjoyed periods of stability followed by instability until it break down completely on the occasion of WW2. In the last fifty years, Europe has enjoyed great stability but social homogeneity has been replaced by great social and religious pluralism. Religious pluralism poses great challenges for secular authorities.
Europe is today largely secular. Religious beliefs have been banned from the public sphere and cannot constitute a source of an official truth supported by the state. Instead, the state has embraced conceptions of power and truth that do not depend on religious beliefs. The separation between theology and philosophy put reason on a pedestal and religious beliefs were relegated in the private sphere. Power and truth have been secularized, but this does not mean that they now enjoy strong foundations. Secularism no doubt achieved much, but it can itself fall prey of criticism. In particular, secularism can be established as the new official truth of the state and this is not necessarily desirable as it entrenches and imposes a rigid interpretation of what is right and what is wrong, whereby religion is classified as being on the wrong side if it aims to speak its voice in public.
A non-moralizing approach requires from each individual that no official truth be taken as written in stone (including the truth of laicite'). It also requires the state to create the preconditions for mutual knowledge, which is the most important goal in order to nurture the natural disposition of individuals and groups to cope with difference. Such an approach is sceptical about conceptions of secularism that rule out altogether the possibility of a public role for religion. Not that religion should enjoy an unlimited access to the public sphere or special protection as it speaks up its voice. It nevertheless cannot be excluded from participation to political affairs as a matter of principle because it may capture some important messages that should be taken into account. Secularism should be regarded as a default framework, a
